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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-one percent of teenage girls and thirty-nine percent of teenage
boys have sent sexually suggestive content to someone they wanted to have
a sexual relationship with or wanted to date.1 Moreover, eighty-three
percent of young adult women and seventy-five percent of young adult men
have sent such material to a boyfriend or girlfriend.2 With the breadth of
Internet-enabled technology available today, widespread dissemination of
words and pictures has never been faster or easier.3 As technology makes
1. NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX AND
TECH: RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 2 (2008), available at
http://thenationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-primarydownload/sex_and_tech_summary.pdf (suggesting that an abundance of “sexting”
material could easily be made publicly available).
2. Id.
3. See Nitke v. Gonzales, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (explaining
that the Internet is a network of interconnected private and public devices linked for
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it increasingly easier to send and receive information—via smartphones,
online businesses, and social media—it has also become easier to distribute
sexually explicit photographs of an individual without his or her consent.4
Although the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
an individual citizen’s right to exercise free speech, the Supreme Court has
ruled that obscenity is not protected speech and, subsequently, has
established a test to classify obscene material.5 Despite this ruling, legal
ramifications for revenge pornography—a form of sexual assault involving
the unauthorized distribution on the Internet of intimate photographs and
videos of a nude individual posing or engaging in various sexual
activities—are absent from federal law, such that the First Amendment
currently clothes perpetrators of revenge pornography with impunity.6
However, the common law right to privacy encompasses potential causes
of action for victims of revenge pornography.7
This Comment argues that revenge pornography is not protected by the
First Amendment and, further, is subject to privacy laws.8 Part II of this
Comment summarizes the history of the First Amendment and its obscenity
doctrine, as well as privacy laws that pertain to revenge pornography on the
Internet.9 Part III argues that revenge pornography, unlike permissible
forms of pornography, is a form of obscenity under Miller v. California and
communications and data-sharing purposes), aff’d, Nitke v. Gonzales, 547 U.S. 1015
(2006).
4. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 887-88, 889-90 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (remarking that similar to zoning laws in general, such as a bouncer
restricting access to a nightclub, adult zoning laws on the Internet should be
permissible to protect members of society from harm).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”); see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973)
(establishing the modern obscenity test and holding that obscene materials are not
protected by the First Amendment because obscenity is not a compelling governmental
interest).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2014) (restricting the dissemination of obscene
materials through various means, but not including public disclosure of explicit images
without consent). See generally END REVENGE PORN, http://www.endrevengeporn.org
(last visited July 26, 2014) (remarking that revenge pornography is usually posted by a
contemptuous ex-partner as a means of reprisal after a relationship has ended bitterly).
7. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960)
(examining the right to privacy and its incorporation of several causes of action,
including intrusion of solitude, public disclosure of private facts, publicly placing one
in false light in the public eye, and appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part II (explaining the evolution and the application to the Internet of
the obscenity legal doctrine and discussing alternative remedies for revenge
pornography victims under privacy law).
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therefore is not entitled to First Amendment protection.10 Additionally,
Part III contends that there are several common law causes of action for
revenge pornography under right to privacy claims.11 Part IV urges the
interpretation of revenge pornography as obscene under the current First
Amendment obscenity doctrine and recommends the enactment of state and
federal laws banning revenge pornography because of its injurious effects
on individuals and society.12 Part V concludes that because revenge
pornography satisfies the Miller obscenity test and postings on the Internet
are considered interstate commerce, Congress and state legislatures should
revise current obscenity statutes or create new ones; further, the federal and
state courts should interpret these laws so as to provide sufficient remedies
for the harm caused by the dissemination of revenge pornography and to
make clear that such speech is not encapsulated in the right to free speech.13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
1. Obscenity and the Right to Free Speech
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
citizens, not the government, have the absolute right to propagate a
multitude of ideas, regardless of whether these ideas are contrary to the
government’s beliefs.14 However, in Breard v. City of Alexandria, the
Court held that all types and all forms of speech are not necessarily
protected under the First Amendment.15 For example, the Court in Miller
v. California held that obscenity and obscene speech are exceptions to

10. See infra Part III (arguing that revenge pornography, under the current
obscenity doctrine, aligns with the legal definition of obscenity and is constitutionally
unprotected speech).
11. See infra Part III (asserting that even if revenge pornography were not deemed
obscene, privacy laws create potentially viable causes of action for a victim).
12. See infra Part IV (recommending federal and state policy changes consistent
with obscenity and revenge pornography as constitutionally unprotected speech).
13. See infra Part V (concluding that because revenge pornography is obscene
speech unprotected by the First Amendment and is subject to several privacy laws,
statutes prohibiting it are vital to protect society and to further governmental interests).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (safeguarding the right to free speech because the
government does not have the power to moderate speech based on its purported
messages or ideas).
15. See Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (clarifying that
when there is a greater governmental interest at issue, the First and Fourteenth
Amendment protections are not absolute guarantees).
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constitutional protection.16
Obscenity tests serve as a method of
determining whether certain materials involving sexual conduct, as forms
of expression and speech, are permissible and, thus, protected by the
Constitution’s right to free speech guarantee.17 Notwithstanding, the
Supreme Court has struggled to formulate and apply concrete standards
when addressing “the intractable obscenity problem.”18
Still, the Court in Roth v. United States affirmed that obscenity is not
constitutionally protected speech and formulated a since-overruled test:
Material is considered obscene if, as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
the prurient interest (i.e. a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion) and if it goes substantially beyond customary sensible limits in
the description or representation of the matter.19 In applying this test, the
Court explicitly rejected that the First Amendment protected obscene
speech and, consequently, sustained a conviction under a federal statute
punishing the petitioner for unsolicited mailing of obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy circulars and advertising.20 Because the obscene
circulars and advertising depicted individuals engaging in sexual activities
and were sent to solicit sales from unwilling recipients of such material,
they were intended to appeal to a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion that went substantially beyond the customary sensible
limits in their description and representation.21
Subsequently, the Court in Stanley v. Georgia unanimously held that
while obscenity is unprotected under the First Amendment, the government
could not punish mere private possession of obscene material.22 However,
16. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (holding that objectionable
words and depictions that are offensive to the morals of society may not be protected
speech because they encroach upon more important societal interests).
17. See id. at 23-24 (confining the obscenity test to material that involves sexual
conduct).
18. Id. at 16 (noting a substantial increase of unregulated obscene material
proliferating within the public domain).
19. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (defining prurient
interest as having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts); see also BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1182, 1279 (9th ed. 2010) (defining obscene as extremely offensive and
grossly repugnant to existing community standards of morality and decency, and
defining pornography as material depicting sexual activity or erotic behavior that
provokes sexual excitement).
20. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-85, 491, 494 (stating that these depictions tend to
stir sexual impulses and lead to sexually impure thoughts).
21. See id. at 494 (Warren, J., concurring) (noting that in going beyond customary
sensible limits, the appellant intended for the prurient and obscene materials to corrupt
and debauch the minds and morals of its recipients).
22. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969) (touting a right to privacy
such that unwanted government incursion into private possession of obscene material is
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the Court expounded that the government can still ban public distribution
of such material.23 A plurality of the Court in Memoirs v. Attorney General
of Massachusetts added an additional element to the Roth obscenity test:
When considered as a whole, the work must be utterly without redeeming
social value to be considered obscene and, accordingly, unprotected by the
Constitution.24 The Court held that the published memoir at issue was
protected speech, regardless of whether it appealed to the prurient interest
and was patently offensive, because it had some redeeming value.25 Using
the obscenity test delineated in Roth, the Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio held
that an explicit love scene during the last reel of the film at issue was not
hard-core pornography because it was so fragmented and fleeting that only
a censorship alert would apprise the audience that something questionable
was occurring.26 In addition, the film was held not to be utterly without
redeeming social value because it received favorable reviews in various
national publications.27
In the subsequent 1973 seminal case Miller v. California, the Supreme
Court cemented obscenity as unprotected speech by upholding a conviction
against the petitioner for mailing adult book advertisements containing
pictures and drawings of men and women performing sexual acts with
visible genitalia.28 The Miller Court explicitly rejected the “utterly without
redeeming social value” prong set forth in Memoirs and rebranded the
current test, which considers whether: (1) the average person applying
contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the work depicts or describes
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way as defined by applicable state
unjustifiable).
23. See id. (stating that obscene material is subject to restriction once it enters the
public realm because it impedes on the governmental interest of protecting society from
harm).
24. See Memoirs v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1966) (concluding
that a single explicit scene does not establish the sole value of a piece of art when it
advocates ideas or has social importance).
25. See id. at 419-20 (stating that the work will have social value in the hands of
those who publish or distribute it on the basis of that value, and therefore, with all
possible uses in mind, the book is not utterly without redeeming social value).
26. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 186-87, 197 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (remarking that the explicit scene was not obscene because its ephemeral
nature did not go beyond customary limits of sensibilities).
27. See id. at 196 (inferring that the film would not offend the sensibilities of the
majority based on a national standpoint of customary sensible limits).
28. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16-17 (1973) (upholding the lower
court’s conviction because the brochures were prurient, patently offensive, and lacked
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
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law; and (3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value in accordance with a national standard.29
Prurient, patently offensive materials illustrating or describing sexual
conduct must have serious, literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to
comport with the government’s interest in protecting society from harm
and thereby benefit from First Amendment protection.30 For example, the
Court in Miller expressed that medical textbooks, with explicit depictions
and descriptions of human anatomy, have societal value as educational
tools and, consequently, are not considered obscene under the First
Amendment.31 Thus, censoring obscene material does not discount the
right to free speech because the government’s interest in a marketplace of
ideas outweighs any value derived from the commercial sale of obscene
material.32 Because of the Miller obscenity test, a prurient, patently
offensive work that lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value as a whole will be deemed obscene and unprotected speech under the
First Amendment.33
2. Pornography as Speech
Although obscene material is a form of constitutionally unprotected
speech, pornography depicting mere nudity is not obscene and, therefore, is
entitled to First Amendment protection.34 In Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court
concluded that a film with scenes of sexual conduct did not appeal to the
prurient interest nor constitute patently offensive material, but did have

29. See id. at 24-25 (advancing that a statute could regulate patently offensive
representations or descriptions of (1) ultimate sexual acts and (2) masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals).
30. See id. at 26, 30 (stating that the diversity of viewpoints throughout the United
States is used to determine the national societal value of a work under the third prong,
yet, the first two prongs of the test are based on community standards because the
country is too big and too diverse for a single formula to be applicable to all fifty
states).
31. See id. (contending that these types of textbooks could be considered prurient
and patently offensive, yet have value in serving the governmental interest of educating
medical professionals).
32. See id. at 35-36 (acknowledging a lack of empirical evidence proclaiming that
stern censorship of public distribution and display of obscene material represses
citizens’ expressions of serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific ideas).
33. See id. at 30 (remarking that lay jurors have generally been permitted to draw
from the standards of their own community because requiring a national standard
would be an exercise in futility).
34. The arguments in this Comment are limited to revenge pornography. See
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (finding that mere nudity is not obscene
because nudity alone does not satisfy the standards set out in Miller).
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social value.35 The film at issue in Jenkins did not visibly display genitalia,
the actors’ bodies were not emphasized by the camera’s scrutiny, and
neither the entire film nor the focal points of the film consisted of sexually
explicit scenes.36 In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court
held a city ordinance prohibiting drive-in theatres from showing films with
nudity invalid because the ordinance over-inclusively targeted films solely
on the basis of nudity.37 The Court did not analyze the work under the
Miller obscenity test, but instead stated that, absent an intolerable invasion
of substantial privacy interests, the government may not halt discourse
exclusively to protect others from hearing it.38 Thus, when not considered
obscene under the standards of Miller, mere nudity as a form of
pornography, including depictions of nude bathers on a beach, remains a
form of constitutionally protected speech.39
Additionally, in Nitke v. Gonzales, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that the right to free speech,
including certain forms of pornography, has subsequently attached to
speech on the Internet; however, obscenity laws are still applicable to
Internet transmissions.40 The forms of pornography at issue in that case
were non-mainstream sexual activities, including sadomasochism.41 As
such, the Court in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union struck down the
anti-indecency sections of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(“CDA”) as an overbroad suppression of speech, leaving in place § 230,

35. See id. (confirming that nothing in the film conforms to the patently offensive
examples expressed in Miller).
36. See id. (stating that a work of nudity alone is not lewd or obscene because,
taken as a whole, it could still hold value even if construed as prurient or patently
offensive).
37. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) (declaring that
speech that is not obscene cannot be restricted only because the legislature deems it
incompatible with governmental interests).
38. See id. at 209-10 (reasoning that the burden is on the viewer to avoid a steady
attack of perceived offensiveness on his sensibilities by averting his eyes).
39. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (remarking that governmental
interests are furthered by works of value, such as those that substantially educate the
public).
40. See Nitke v. Gonzales, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (reasoning
that Congress may prevent the channels of interstate commerce, including the
Internet—which links devices as a means of communicative speech and is where
revenge pornography is disseminated—from being used to spread physical, moral, or
economic evils), aff’d, Nitke v. Gonzales, 547 U.S. 1015 (2006).
41. See id. at 264, 270 (noting that depictions of these non-mainstream acts violate
some contemporary standards of decency and may be subject to prosecution in multiple
jurisdictions under the Communications Decency Act).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss1/5

8

Genn: What Comes Off, Comes Back to Burn: Revenge Pornography as the Ho

2014]

WHAT COMES OFF, COMES BACK TO BURN

171

which provides legal immunity for Internet service providers.42 Yet, in
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court upheld a law that
attempted to restrict minors’ access to obscene materials on the Internet.43
The Court declared that because community standards are used to
determine obscene materials under the Miller obscenity test, a publisher
sending obscene material to a specific community via the Internet is
responsible for complying with the contemporary standards of that
community.44 Although the right to free speech is inclusive of certain
forms of pornography on the Internet, restrictions on other forms, such as
obscene revenge pornography, are permissible.45
B. Privacy Law
The right to privacy is not expressly prescribed in the United States
Constitution.46 Justices Warren and Brandeis authored an article in 1890
that acknowledged a right to privacy arising out of a concern for public
exposure of private information through the increasing use of new
technologies; however, the right protects neither affairs deemed legitimate
public interests nor previously publicized facts.47 The right to privacy
protects written or artistically expressed thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
of individuals through an implied contract, a duty of confidence, and a duty
of trust.48 Specifically, under a duty of trust, an individual trusts that
42. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (stating that Internet service
providers are not categorized as publishers and, therefore, are not liable for the actions
or words of third parties on their websites).
43. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569-70 (2002) (distinguishing the
constitutional Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”) from the overly-broad CDA
because COPA only covers (1) material posted on the Internet, (2) commercial
communications, and (3) a limited type of material harmful to minors).
44. See id. at 583 (stating that if a publisher seeks to communicate with only those
in an avant-garde culture, it must use a medium that allows it to target the release of
material into that culture to conform to contemporary community standards).
45. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (extrapolating that a state may
protect society from harm by regulating patently offensive representations or
descriptions, which could encompass revenge pornography).
46. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967) (noting that the right to
privacy is recognized judicially or statutorily in thirty-four states and Washington,
D.C.).
47. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195-96, 216 (1890) (stating that the prevention of private or compromising
information being revealed to the public is an important societal interest, such that
matters concerning an individual’s private life, habits, acts, and relations that are not
linked to any public act or to his or her competence for public office are not legitimate
public interests).
48. See id. at 199 (acknowledging that personal diaries and personal letters warrant
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another will not publish, without consent, writings, pictures, or art relating
to the individual’s private life.49
Furthermore, William Prosser’s Privacy detailed modern privacy law
and the formation of four separate tort claims subsequently codified in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts: (1) intrusion of solitude, (2) public
disclosure of private facts, (3) placing a person in false light in the public
eye, and (4) appropriation of name or likeness.50
1. Intrusion of Solitude
For an intrusion of solitude claim to be valid, the court in Melvin v.
Burling held that a plaintiff must prove there was an unauthorized physical
or electronic intrusion into his solitude, the intrusion was objectionable or
highly offensive to a reasonable person, the matter intruded upon was
private, and the intrusion caused anguish and suffering.51 In Melvin, the
defendant intentionally ordered merchandise in the plaintiffs’ names to be
sent to the plaintiffs’ home without their consent, which was then followed
by creditors’ demands for the plaintiffs to pay for the merchandise.52 The
court held that this type of activity violated the plaintiffs’ expectation of
privacy and therefore was a highly offensive private intrusion that
necessarily caused anguish.53 In Cason v. Baskin, an intrusion of solitude
claim was held to include ordinary, not hypersensitive, sensibilities of the
plaintiff’s life where he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy.54
There, the Supreme Court of Florida held that an unauthorized publication
of the plaintiff’s life history within a biological narrative violated the
plaintiff’s expected level of privacy because the lack of consent to the nonnewsworthy publication could cause anguish and be deemed highly
protection from publication).
49. See id. at 209 (stating that the principle of privacy rests on the right to a
possessory interest in one’s personal property).
50. See Prosser, supra note 7, at 389 (noting that these privacy torts have nothing
in common except an indeterminate “right to be left alone”).
51. See Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(considering the manner in which the defendant obtained the information, not what is
gathered from the information, as the determining factor).
52. See id. at 1012 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs’ complaint was adequate to
defeat the defendant’s motion to dismiss because it satisfied the four elements of the
claim).
53. See id. at 1013-14 (noting that the difficulty of returning merchandise and
dealing with irate creditors is objectionable and, moreover, is sufficient to warrant
anguish and suffering).
54. See Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 1944) (stating that the right to
privacy does not prohibit the publication of a matter which is of legitimate public
interest).
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offensive to the sensibilities of a reasonable person.55
In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court rejected a claim for intrusion of
solitude because speech on a public sidewalk regarding matters of public
concern, which in that case included picket signs stating, “Thank God for
Dead Soldiers,” “Fags Doom Nations,” and “America is Doomed,” is
protected, even if found to be outrageous.56 The Court held that the
plaintiff was not part of a captive audience because of the public nature and
the public location of the speech; hence, to ensure public debate is not
stifled, speech concerning public issues in public places, although possibly
hurtful, must be protected.57 Where a highly offensive unauthorized
intrusion of a private matter causes anguish or suffering, a viable claim for
intrusion of solitude will lie.58
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
According to Peterson v. Moldofsky, the United States District Court for
the District of Kansas held that a cause of action for public disclosure of
private facts is valid when a defendant publishes information that is not
known to the public, is not of newsworthy or legitimate concern to the
public, is personal such that its disclosure would offend a reasonable
person, and is widely communicated to the public.59 In Peterson, a genuine
issue of material fact existed where the defendant—who previously had
sexual encounters with the plaintiff—photographed and videotaped the
plaintiff engaging in sexual activities with two other individuals then
emailed these photographs to the plaintiff’s mother, ex-husband, ex-in
laws, current boyfriend, boss, and coworkers.60
As elaborated by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Zieve v. Hairston,
55. See id. at 244-45, 253 (considering that a claim for intrusion will lie where the
informational aspect of the release of information is secondary).
56. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219-20 (2011) (observing that the
picketers stayed one thousand feet away from the funeral, which was far enough away
so as not to disturb it or intrude upon the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy).
57. See id. at 1220 (remarking that the time and place of the speech did not alter its
public and protected nature).
58. See Melvin, 490 N.E.2d at 1013-14 (inferring that this claim for intrusion of
solitude should stand because there are circumstances in which privacy, as a sensitive
and necessary human value, must enjoy the protection of the law).
59. See Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633,
at *16 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (stating that a matter is publicized when it is reported to
the public at large or to enough people that it is substantially certain to become public
knowledge).
60. See id. at *1-2 (observing that sexual activity of an individual is a personal,
private, and non-newsworthy event, such that its wide dissemination to the public,
which was the material fact at issue, would offend a reasonable person).
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for a fact to be deemed private, the plaintiff must have expected that fact to
remain private, and society must be willing to accept this expectation as
reasonable.61 In Zieve, the court concluded that a jury could have found the
television advertisements—which disclosed, against the plaintiff’s will, the
plaintiff’s hair replacement treatments that were intended to remain private
knowledge—were offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities.62 In Snyder v. Phelps, the plaintiff’s claim for public
disclosure of private facts was dismissed because the speech at issue
involved picketing on public matters in a public place such that no private
facts of the plaintiff were disclosed to the public.63
3. False Light in the Public Eye
The Supreme Court in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Company
articulated that to prove a claim of false light, a plaintiff must show that the
published facts that allegedly render a false impression of the plaintiff were
made by the defendant knowing of their falsity or in reckless disregard for
the truth, the defendant distributed the publication to a reasonable number
of people, and the publication would be objectionable to a reasonable
person under the circumstances.64 According to Peterson v. Moldofsky, a
reasonable number of people can consist of the public at large or as few as
five people.65 Although commercial publication is not required, the Court
in Cantrell held that because knowingly publishing falsehoods of another
could be deemed inherently objectionable, the respondent depicted the
petitioner in a false light in the public eye by reporting several inaccuracies
and false statements of the petitioner’s mental state and general well-being

61. See Zieve v. Hairston, 598 S.E.2d 25, 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (remarking that
although plaintiffs cannot reasonably expect facts contained in the public record to be
private, offensiveness can nonetheless be found when these facts were originally
disclosed without permission).
62. See id. at 29 (noting that the plaintiff requested the advertisements not to be
shown at all, and if they were shown, not to be shown within five hundred miles of his
hometown).
63. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (reasoning that the
picketing did not intrude on the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
64. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249-50, 252-53 (1974)
(stating that calculated falsehoods are sufficient to warrant liability for placing the
plaintiff in a false light because a claim of false light focuses on the defendant’s
knowing or reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s privacy and not necessarily on the truth
or falsity of the material); see also Prosser, supra note 7, at 400.
65. See Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633,
at *18 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (holding that speech is publicized faster on the Internet
because the Internet enables users to quickly surmount barriers of traditional
communication).
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from a fabricated “follow-up” interview when, in fact, the petitioner was
only present at the initial interview.66
4. Appropriation of Name or Likeness
Under a claim of appropriation of one’s name or likeness, a plaintiff
must show his or her name or likeness, including photographs or portraits,
was used without authorization by the defendant for commercial benefit.67
In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News—where the defendant published
poster renditions of a National Football League quarterback who recently
won the Super Bowl championship—the Sixth District Court of Appeal of
California held that the right to use one’s own name or likeness for his or
her own benefit is violated when his or her name or likeness is used for
commercial benefit by a third party lacking authorization.68 Yet, this rule
was inapplicable to the plaintiff in Montana because he was a public figure
involved in matters of public concern, namely winning a recent national
sports championship.69 In Allen v. National Video, a statutory right to
privacy was held to encompass the right to publicity in one’s own name or
likeness.70 There, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York acknowledged that the defendant used a look-a-like of the
plaintiff to advertise commercial services without the permission of the
plaintiff; however, the plaintiff could not make out a valid claim of
appropriation of one’s name or likeness because, in that jurisdiction, using
a look-a-like did not qualify as a portrait or picture of the plaintiff.71

66. See Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 247-48, 252-53 (noting that these facts reveal a
publication of known falsehoods about the plaintiff that falsely portrays the plaintiff to
the public and is damaging to the plaintiff’s reputation).
67. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641-42
(Ct. App. 1995) (clarifying that a constitutional right to reproduce information
originally exempted newsworthy information of public interest from a claim of
appropriation).
68. See id. at 640-41.
69. See id. at 641-42 (recognizing that while private individuals do retain the right
of publicity against the use of his or her own name and likeness in the media, a public
figure does not because that figure is necessarily newsworthy and of public interest).
70. See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(holding that the common law right of publicity includes the additional element
requiring the plaintiff to prove a property interest with a monetary or commercial value
in his or her name or likeness).
71. See id. at 624 (acknowledging that a jury would find that most people could
not identify an actual photograph of the plaintiff and think it was the plaintiff himself in
the defendant’s advertisements).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Revenge Pornography Should Not Be Afforded Free Speech Protection
Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution Because It Is
Obscene.
1. Revenge Pornography Causes Sexual Excitement; Therefore, the
Average Person Would Find that the Work Appeals to the Prurient Interest.
The First Amendment protects pornographic writings, photographs, and
movies displaying sexual activity or erotic behavior in a way designed to
arouse sexual excitement.72 However, the First Amendment does not
protect obscenity, under which certain forms of pornography and
subordinating sexual depictions may be classified.73 Because revenge
pornography involves the posting and distribution of intimate, nude, and
sexually erotic photographs of an individual on the Internet without
consent, it is deemed a form of pornography.74 As a form of both
pornography and speech, revenge pornography has the potential to be
obscene, making the Miller obscenity test applicable to the issue.75
Although revenge pornography websites are generally viewed by willing
recipients, the displayed individual is an unwilling participant in the public
distribution of such material when he or she did not give permission or
agree to such distribution.76 Similar to the advertisements in Miller, the
victim of revenge pornography is displayed in a nude and sexually erotic
position or engaging in sexual activity with his or her genitals or breasts as
the emphasis of the representation.77 This differs from Jenkins v. Georgia,
where the Supreme Court held that the depictions of sexual conduct in the
72. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (defining pornography as
material that inherently appeals to the prurient interest because it elicits sexual thoughts
and lascivious desires).
73. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that sexually explicit material is determined based on the speaker’s subjective
viewpoint).
74. See id. at 329 (explaining that pornography has the power of speech in view of
the fact that subordinating depictions of women can perpetuate the actual subordination
of women).
75. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (delineating a three-part
test to determine obscene material because the government has a legitimate interest in
regulating material that could be exposed to minors or offend the sensibilities of
unwilling recipients).
76. See id. at 18 (observing that unwilling recipients are those who did not give
authorization or consent).
77. See id. (noting that the pictured individuals in the advertisements had genitals
clearly visible while engaging in sexual activities).
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film at issue did not appeal to the prurient interest because there were no
genitalia visible and the camera did not focus on the actors’ bodies during
sexual scenes.78 As explained above, consensual and artistic nudity by
itself does not propel material illustrating sexual conduct into the
unprotected category of obscenity under Miller.79
However, sexually explicit photographs posted for vengeful or spiteful
purposes, such as revenge pornography, are indicative of narrowing a
viewer’s focal point to the sexual aspect of the photograph to embarrass or
harass the displayed individual; therefore, depictions of revenge
pornography move beyond mere nudity.80 Unlike the artistic appeal
viewers gained from the film in Jenkins, sexually explicit photographs of
nude individuals have an inherent tendency to excite the mind.81 As such,
the disseminators and willing viewers of revenge pornography do not go to
these websites to read the news or to view art, but rather to exact revenge,
view the victim, or for lustful enjoyment and sexual pleasure.82
A boyfriend originally receiving sexually explicit photographs from his
girlfriend, or vice versa, and the average person viewing these photographs
would find that a revenge pornography website resembles a hard-core
pornography website where lewd acts are depicted and lustful thoughts are
elicited.83 Consequently, consistent with Supreme Court Justice Stewart’s
concurring belief in Jacobellis v. Ohio, anyone viewing a website hosting
revenge pornography would certainly discern that the material inherently
appeals to the prurient interest because it represents a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion and offends the sensibilities of the
general public.84 Distinguishable from the Court’s holding in Jacobellis—
where the film at issue was held not to be obscene because the explicit
sexual scene was at the end of the film, was fragmented and fleeting, and
the film as a whole was nationally acclaimed—revenge pornography is
78. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
79. See id. (finding that mere nudity cannot be obscene because nudity alone does

not satisfy the prurient, patently offensive, and lack of value standards in Miller).
80. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (stating
that although technology changes the way people express themselves, people who have
become a captive audience may nonetheless choose to avert their eyes from mere
nudity).
81. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (defining prurient
interest as having a propensity or lascivious desire toward sexual thoughts).
82. See id. (remarking that a lewd and obscene work that appeals to the prurient
interest is not an essential part of any constitutionally protected exposition of ideas).
83. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (accepting the Roth definition
of prurient and stating that obscenity largely depends on the effect the materials have
upon those who receive them).
84. See id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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viewable as a static and non-fragmented prurient depiction with no
nationally recognized awards for its social value.85
In Roth, obscenity was determined by analyzing the work in its totality
based on the viewpoints of the distinct community it had reached.86 The
content, context, and circumstances are all relevant in determining whether
a work tends to excite lustful thoughts in the viewer; as such, revenge
pornography’s depiction of one’s ex-lover standing nude or in a sexually
suggestive position should be viewed with its original purposeful intent in
mind: to arouse the recipient at the time it was sent.87 Like Roth—where
the defendant mailed lewd and lascivious solicitations intended to appeal to
the prurient interest (i.e. a shameful interest in nudity, sex, or excretion)—
revenge pornography, posted with the victim’s personally identifiable
information to a website specifically exhibiting sexual conduct, becomes
engulfed with lewd and lustful surroundings meant to debauch the morals
of its recipients and to appeal to a shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, or excretion.88
To determine the prurient appeal of revenge pornography, the average
person, not an overly sensitive or insensitive person, applies the standards
of the local community where a claim involving such material is being
adjudicated.89 Thus, revenge pornography that is legally obscene in one
community may enjoy full protection in another.90 Unlike the plaintiff’s
case in Nitke—which was dismissed because the plaintiff could not prove
how much speech would be impaired based on the use of different
community standards—revenge pornography has the potential to be upheld

85. See id. at 196-97 (emphasizing that a fragmented sexually explicit scene would
not surpass customary limits of sensibilities and does not detract from the value derived
from a nationally acclaimed work).
86. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 490 (mandating that the jury must not solely take into
account a single part of the work and must consider each demographic of society in
determining the standards of their community).
87. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (explaining that a work
as a whole should take into account its words and context to determine if it infringes on
the harm Congress intended to prevent).
88. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 490 (noting that the same work may have varying
impacts depending on the ideals of different communities).
89. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33-34 (1973) (stating that narrowing the
standard to a certain locale defends against an arbitrary hypothetical standard that
would be improperly applied in a large and diverse nation); see also United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that federal obscenity laws involve
acts in more than one state whereby the government can prosecute individuals who
transport obscene material in any district where the material is sent or received).
90. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-33 (realizing people in different states have a
myriad of tastes and attitudes which should not be subject to uniformity).
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as obscene in various jurisdictions because little to no permissible speech
would be impaired by a prohibition against obscene revenge pornography.91
In addition, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union held that a publisher sending obscene material into a specific
community via the Internet is responsible for complying with the
contemporary standards of that community; however, obscene material is
not forbidden merely because an unintended audience might obtain it.92
Because obscenity laws are applicable to Internet transmissions, which
occur in every jurisdiction, the prurient appeal of revenge pornography as
viewed by a community in either Las Vegas or Salt Lake City would
nonetheless appeal to the average person’s idea of sexual conduct that is
intended to excite lustful thoughts.93 Further, regardless of where the
revenge pornography is observed, its appeal to a prurient interest is evident
to an average person viewing it in light of its content and context.94
Revenge pornography is viewable on Internet-enabled devices twentyfour hours per day, seven days per week around the world by perpetrators,
victims, or anyone with an Internet connection lacking content filters or
content blockers.95 This type of access to revenge pornography is
distinguishable from Ashcroft, where the Court reasoned that content filters
and content blockers were narrow and, accordingly, acceptable methods of
restricting unwilling recipients’ and minors’ access to hard-core
pornography on the Internet.96 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Stanley v.
91. See Nitke v. Gonzales, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that
the plaintiffs did not show sufficient evidence of how many websites mentioning a
certain type of sexual conduct would be considered obscene altogether or in one
community and not another).
92. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569-70, 604-05 (2002) (stating that a
publisher must take steps to use a medium that allows for a targeted release of material
into the intended communities).
93. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973) (holding that Congress
may regulate obscenity in interstate commerce and its channels once it leaves the
privacy of the home in any way).
94. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 (maintaining that community standards are the
appropriate adjudicatory method because it is unnecessary and unwise to mandate that
people in one locale accept the prurient interest standard of a potentially more sinful
locale).
95. See Nitke, 413 F. Supp. at 265 (recognizing that the advent of the Internet has
facilitated a proliferation of communications and data-sharing across jurisdictional
boundaries via the World Wide Web).
96. See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 604-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(contending that merely because an unintended audience could obtain obscene material
does not make it constitutionally impermissible). But see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 849 (1997) (stating that the Internet is located in no particular geographical
location and is available to anyone who has access anywhere in the world).
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Georgia observed that although the right to receive information and the
right to personal privacy are fundamental, there are limited instances where
the government can justifiably moderate these rights; obscene material is
one such instance, as it carries the potential to cause serious public harm.97
Together with false statements and personally identifiable information of
an unwillingly displayed individual, a revenge-seeking online post of that
nude individual in a sexually provocative pose represents a shameful
interest in sexual conduct and nudity that exceeds the customary limits of
the societal importance of pornographic material.98 Thus, representations
of revenge pornography fall outside the parameters of constitutionally
protected pornographic displays because they entice the prurient interest
and inflict individual and societal harm.99
2. Revenge Pornography Consists of Representations and Descriptions of
Ultimate Sexual Acts and Lewd Exhibition of Genitals; Therefore, It
Depicts Sexual Conduct in a Patently Offensive Way to the Average
Person.
To determine whether revenge pornography appeals to the prurient
interest and is patently offensive under the Miller obscenity test,
community standards of the locale where it is disseminated and where the
jury is adjudicating must be applied.100 Because obscenity laws are
applicable to Internet transmissions, which transcend jurisdictional
boundaries, the average person must similarly analyze the patent
offensiveness of revenge pornography dispersed via the Internet using the
community standards of the venue where the lawsuit is brought and where
the material is sent.101 Like the prurient appeal prong of the Miller
obscenity test, the content, context, and circumstances of revenge
pornography taken as a whole become relevant in establishing whether the
97. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (advancing that the
government can regulate the public spread of ideas hostile to public morality, but not
private thoughts).
98. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that a work that
does not appeal to the prurient interest or is not utterly without redeeming social
importance is generally permissible under contemporary community standards of
pornographic material).
99. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566 (stating that the government cannot control
private thoughts but can regulate the public promulgation of ideas destructive to public
morality).
100. See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 576 n.7 (asserting that the jury is to apply community
standards to questions of fact regarding patent offensiveness).
101. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973) (holding that because
Congress can regulate interstate commerce and its channels, it may regulate obscenity
in the public sphere).
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average person applying community standards would also find the work
patently offensive.102 Because a uniform national standard is not required,
the testimony of a state’s expert on community standards or the instructions
of a trial judge on statewide standards are sufficient to determine what
could be deemed prurient and patently offensive in that jurisdiction.103
In concert with a vindictive mindset, descriptions and representations of
sexual positions and sexual activities shadowed by sexual overtones and
sexual connotations serve to excite lustful thoughts that may be patently
offensive to the average observer.104 If the average person in a community
does not take or send the types of images that comprise revenge
pornography, then such images have the potential to offend that average
person, as well as the substantial majority of average persons within that
community.105 Comparable to Nitke v. Gonzales—where the plaintiffs
faced a significant risk of images being deemed patently offensive in most
jurisdictions because they depicted non-mainstream sexual activities such
as sadomasochism—certain depictions of revenge pornography
disseminated to the viewing public via the Internet could be deemed nonmainstream by the average person who does not personally take and send
nude photographs of themselves or others engaging in these types of sexual
activities.106
In line with Miller—where the petitioner sent out unsolicited sexually
explicit brochures to unwilling recipients—revenge pornography is
broadcast on the Internet by the perpetrator without the request,
authorization, or consent of the unwillingly displayed individual.107
Because revenge pornography moves beyond mere nudity and is not
willingly authorized by the victim, it has the potential to offend the
sensibilities of the average person and conflict with the government’s

102. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (explaining that the
whole work along with its words and context must be considered by the jury when
determining if it infringes on the harm Congress intended to prevent).
103. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-31 (1973) (discussing that
community standards were assumed to be that of the lawsuit venue, and not of a
hypothetical standard of the entire United States).
104. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566 (finding that the government can regulate ideas
harmful to public morality).
105. See Nitke v. Gonzales, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262, 264, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(proffering that such acts will not fit within some community standards because they
conform to the outlined examples of patent offensiveness in Miller).
106. See id. at 271.
107. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 (noting that the brochures containing men and
women in groups engaging in sexual activities with their genitals prominently
displayed were sent to unwilling recipients without their request or consent).
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interest in protecting society from harm.108
Therefore, revenge
pornography falls within the states’ legitimate interest in regulating the
display or distribution of obscene material when it would offend unwilling
participants or recipients or be exposed to minors.109
Because a state statute can regulate patently offensive representations
and descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, lewd exhibition of
genitalia, and normal, perverted, actual, or simulated sexual acts, a
disseminator of revenge pornography could be convicted of mailing or
distributing unauthorized depictions displaying genitalia of those
performing ultimate sexual acts, per the circumstances in Miller.110 Unlike
in Jenkins—where no genitalia were visible, the camera did not concentrate
on the actors’ bodies, and the sexual scenes did not persist throughout the
entire film nor were they the focal points of the film as a whole—the
retributive idea behind revenge pornography necessarily establishes
depictions of unwilling nude individuals with exposed genitals, penetration
of sex toys, masturbation, and overt sexual positions as the principal parts
of the work.111 Consequently, because revenge pornography aligns with
the examples of patently offensive representations and descriptions in
Miller, a jury applying community standards would find it to be patently
offensive.112
3. As a Whole, Revenge Pornography Is Displayed Solely for Retributive
Purposes; Therefore, It Lacks Serious Literary, Social, Political, and
Scientific Value as Viewed in Accordance with a National Standard.
Because all discussions or depictions of sex are not obscene per se,
prurient and patently offensive representations of revenge pornography
must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to fall
within the First Amendment’s zone of protected speech.113 Under this
108. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (stating that
the government cannot place restrictions on speech solely based on the content of that
speech).
109. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567 (recognizing that the unwilling receipt of obscene
material is a disruption to public sensibilities).
110. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 16, 18 (upholding the lower court’s conviction under
CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a), which makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly distribute
obscene material).
111. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (noting that the entire film
was not obscene because several peripheral nude scenes do not align with the examples
of patent offensiveness in Miller and, further, could still hold value).
112. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (explaining that ultimate sexual acts, lewd
exhibition, masturbation, or excretion are deemed patently offensive by community
standards).
113. See id. at 24-26 (rejecting the utterly without redeeming social importance

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss1/5

20

Genn: What Comes Off, Comes Back to Burn: Revenge Pornography as the Ho

2014]

WHAT COMES OFF, COMES BACK TO BURN

183

prong—whether the work has serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value—a national standard determines the value, if any, of
revenge pornography.114
Similar to medical textbooks that use explicit depictions and descriptions
of human anatomy—which were held to be permissible under Miller—
revenge pornography displays sexually explicit images of various forms of
human anatomy.115 However, whereas medical textbooks state and explain
factual evidence related to these descriptions and representations to educate
individuals about medical matters, the intention behind revenge
pornography—to inflict physical, mental, and emotional harm on the
victim—furthers no educational or valuable literary, artistic, political, or
scientific objectives.116 Moreover, revenge pornography is unlike literary
books that take the reader through sexual fantasy, unlike Michelangelo’s
“David,” unlike a nudist colony banner supporting one political party or
another, and unlike medical textbooks because, taken as a whole, it
ostracizes the victim, diminishes his or her reputation, and holds out no
value to society at large; these deleterious corollaries are contrary to the
governmental interests of protecting society from harm and promoting
literary, artistic, political, and scientific works of value.117
Revenge pornography is not mere nudity and should not be given the
same protection as permissible pornography because there is no artistic
value in displaying lewdly exposed genitals, penetration of sex toys,
masturbation, overt sexual positions, and descriptions of the victim’s sexual
fantasies accompanied by his or her name, workplace, and address
exclusively for malevolent purposes.118 Additionally, these displays are
exhibited not on occasion or as one part of a larger display of artistic value
prong from Memoirs because it is a near impossible burden for a prosecutor to prove
and has never received more than a plurality vote by the Supreme Court); see also
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567 (holding that there is an implied right to possess obscenity in
one’s home because it does not interfere with governmental interests); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85, 487 (1957) (stating that sex and obscenity are different
because sex can have even the slightest redeeming social value while obscenity
cannot).
114. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (contending that the United States is too big and has
too many diverse viewpoints to use a single formulation as the standard for the prurient
interest and patently offensive prongs).
115. See id. at 26 (implying that these types of textbooks serve the governmental
interest of educating members of society, especially medical professionals).
116. See id. (indicating that a prurient and patently offensive work depicting sexual
conduct must also lack any value to be held legally obscene).
117. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975) (reiterating
that nudity in certain contexts can have literary, artistic, political, or scientific value).
118. See id.
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as held permissible in Jenkins, but as the entire work of revenge
pornography itself.119 The Supreme Court, in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, upheld Jenkins on the grounds that content-based regulations
of mere nudity must take into consideration the context and extent of
exposure; otherwise, bathers on a beach would be an impermissible display
of obscenity.120 Whereas bathers depicted in a movie or described in a
literary novel would have value, the context of revenge pornography—the
disseminators’ spiteful intent and the victim’s personally identifiable
information—drastically reduces or nullifies any potential artistic or
literary value.121 Distinguishable from Erznoznik and Miller, revenge
pornography does not solely depict mere nudity in the form of bathers,
align with the examples expressed by the Court in Erznoznik, or teach
society valuable information regarding human anatomy.122 Thus, the
maligned value of revenge pornography from that stated in Miller gives rise
to intolerable invasions of citizens’ substantial privacy interests and holds
no societal or artistic value nor facilitates any governmental interest.123
Because revenge pornography generally takes the form of a picture
accompanied by the displayed individual’s personally identifiable
information as a means of seeking retribution, the average person would be
hard-pressed to conclude, as the Supreme Court in Memoirs v. Attorney
General of Massachusetts did, that this type of prurient and patently
offensive work nonetheless has redeeming social value.124 Placing sexually
explicit photographs in the context of retribution and publicly displaying
them without authorization destroys any de minimis value originally
derived from them, while only the destructive value the perpetrator seeks to
attain remains.125
119. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (providing that the film at
issue displayed mere nude sexual conduct for artistic purposes in several separate parts
of the work, which is constitutionally permissible).
120. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213 (permitting nudity as part of a larger display
because it has value in the eyes of those who view it in its totality).
121. See id.
122. See id. (acknowledging that depictions of a baby’s buttocks, nude bodies of
victims of war, or scenes from a culture in which nudity is indigenous cannot be
restricted from works of value).
123. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (remarking that value can be
derived from works that substantially educate the public, and that such works are
considered protected speech because they promote this governmental interest).
124. See Memoirs v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 419-20 (1966) (finding that
a work can have the slightest redeeming social value if citizens view it in light of such
value).
125. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (stating that
congressional intent can imply certain important values while those values that impede
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When a depiction of revenge pornography is prurient and patently
offensive, it differs from permissible pornography because it also lacks any
substantive value.126
Although indecent and explicit speech is
constitutionally protected in certain instances, revenge pornography is
comprised of more than indecency and explicitness: it is morally repugnant,
prurient, patently offensive, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and
scientific value; consequently, it does not warrant First Amendment
protection.127
B. Even if Held Not to Be Obscene Under Federal Common Law, Revenge
Pornography, by Definition, Is Disclosed to the Public Without the Consent
of the Pictured Subject; Therefore, Four Separate Privacy Torts Could
Each Constitute a Valid Claim Involving Revenge Pornography.
1. A Lawsuit Involving Revenge Pornography Would Be Successful Based
upon a Claim of Intrusion of Solitude.
Revenge pornography pertains to the crux of an intrusion of solitude
claim, under which a plaintiff must prove that there was an unauthorized
physical or electronic intrusion into his or her solitude, the intrusion was
objectionable or highly offensive to a reasonable person, the matter
intruded upon was private, and the intrusion caused anguish and
suffering.128 In addition, the right to privacy protects written and artistic
work and is violated by a breach of confidence, implied contract, or trust,
all of which are present and relied upon in a dating, spousal, and sexual
relationship.129 A duty of trust exists between partners as a cornerstone of
protecting one another’s interests; this duty generally continues after a
separation and is breached when one ex-partner posts private and sexually
explicit photographs of the other on the Internet.130 Further, one partner
trusts that writings, photographs, or artwork relating to his or her private
life will not be published by the other partner without consent.131
on governmental interests may be statutorily barred).
126. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 26 (contending that in addition to its prurient
interest and patent offensiveness, a work must also lack serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value to be legally obscene).
127. See id.
128. See Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 251 (Fla. 1944) (holding that an invasion
of privacy is measured by whether an act would cause mental distress and injury to
anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence under the circumstances).
129. See id. at 248 (noting that it is well-settled common law that, based on a right
to privacy, individuals retain possessory interests in the content of personal facts).
130. See id. at 252 (stating that the matters which are protected from intrusion are
those relating to the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual).
131. See id. at 247-48 (acknowledging that the recipient of a letter owns the paper,

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014

23

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

186

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23.1

In accordance with Cason v. Baskin—where an unauthorized publication
of a personal matter was an intrusion deemed highly offensive to a
reasonable person so as to cause suffering and anguish—an intrusion of
solitude would occur when an unauthorized individual posts a nude
photograph of an ex-partner to any website.132 Moreover, because partners
intend sexually explicit photographs to remain private and protected
through an implied contract, duty of trust, or duty of confidence, posting
revenge pornography intrudes on a personal and private matter where the
informational factor of its disclosure is not the primary reason for
publication.133
As in Melvin v. Burling—where the plaintiffs’ expectation of privacy
was violated as a result of the defendant ordering, without authorization,
merchandise in the plaintiffs’ names to the plaintiffs’ house—the displayed
individual in a depiction of revenge pornography has a reasonable
expectation of privacy such that the unauthorized publication of this
display is embarrassing, objectionable, and consequently, highly offensive
to the victim and to a reasonable person.134 Additionally, discovering a
display of oneself on a revenge pornography website is not only
emotionally disturbing, but it also carries the potential to ruin one’s
reputation as a matter of intrusion.135
Posting a sexually explicit photograph to the Internet is an intrusion by
an ex-partner into private matters that, similar to the alleged but
unwarranted damages in Snyder v. Phelps, tends to cause suffering and
anguish because of its offensiveness.136 Whereas the speech at issue in
Snyder consisted of a public interest expressed in a public place, revenge
pornography involves a private interest exposed in a public place.137
Furthermore, revenge pornography is distinguishable from Snyder—where
but the writer retains a property interest in the contents of the document).
132. See id. at 248.
133. See id. at 253 (emphasizing that the right to privacy may be invoked when the
public interest or informational aspect of the intrusion is secondary).
134. See Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding
that the unauthorized mailings the plaintiffs were subjected to were objectionable
because they violated the plaintiffs’ expectations of privacy in their own names and
place of residence).
135. See Cason, 20 So. 2d at 249 (finding that the law has long considered an
individual’s reputation; hence libel, slander, and the right to privacy arose as remedial
measures).
136. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215, 1219 (2011) (rationalizing that
although the plaintiff suffered great grief, severe depression, and exacerbation of preexisting health conditions, the defendants permissibly picketed peacefully in public on
matters of public concern).
137. See id.
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the plaintiff was not part of a captive audience since the matter disclosed to
the public was not a private matter—because revenge pornography consists
of personal and private matter that is publicly disclosed on the Internet
whereby the victim becomes captive to the disseminator’s sole control of
the highly offensive public representation.138
Although the disseminator of revenge pornography has a physical
possessory interest in the photographs or videos of such material, the
pictured subject retains a possessory property interest in the material’s
content.139 Thus, to avoid infringing on the pictured subject’s rights, the
disclosure of that subject’s private matters requires consent; yet, such
consent is never present in an instance of revenge pornography.140 For the
foregoing reasons, a claim of intrusion of solitude would stand where
revenge pornography entails a non-newsworthy and offensive unauthorized
public display of an individual’s private matters that he or she reasonably
intended to remain private.141
2. A Lawsuit Involving Revenge Pornography Would Be Successful Base
upon a Claim of Public Disclosure of Private Facts.
An implied contract, a duty of trust, and a duty of confidentiality are all
present during a relationship and establish a promise to keep sexually
explicit photographs between partners; a violation of these duties provides
for a valid claim of public disclosure of private facts.142 Posting such
photographs releases them into the public domain and makes them visible
to more than a reasonably small amount of people.143 In Peterson v.
Moldofsky, a genuine issue of material fact as to the public disclosure of
private facts existed where the defendant emailed photographs of his exgirlfriend engaging in sexually explicit activities to more than five

138. See id. at 1212, 1219 (permitting outrageous or harmful speech when it
complies with local laws, is on public property, and is of public concern).
139. See Cason, 20 So. 2d at 247-48 (stating that the rights to liberty and privacy
entail the right to be left alone and the right to possessory interests in tangible and
intangible forms).
140. See id.
141. See Melvin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (upholding a
claim of intrusion of solitude founded on facts that proved objectionable and offensive
activity to a reasonable man).
142. See Cason, 20 So. 2d at 249 (implying that these duties exist to protect an
individual’s right to an inviolate lifestyle and personality).
143. See Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633,
at *15-16 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (observing that the idea behind a claim of public
disclosure of private facts is to protect an individual from the unwarranted distribution
of private facts that serve no governmental or public interest).
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people.144 A jury could view these facts as an instance of revenge
pornography where, with its intention to harm the victim by exposing
sexually explicit photographs of him or her to outsiders, the pornography is
used as a tool to reveal private facts not known to the public and is publicly
disclosed via the Internet to enough people that it is substantially certain to
become public knowledge.145 Because revenge pornography is disclosed
on the Internet, it is widely disseminated amongst the viewing public while
furthering no societal interests.146 Revenge pornography is frequently
published alongside facts not known to the public at large, unless
previously and consensually disclosed by the displayed individual.147
These facts include, but are not limited to, sexual tendencies, lifestyle
preferences, name, age, location, address, and workplace, none of which
are newsworthy absent a public interest.148 Distinguishable from Snyder v.
Phelps, revenge pornography involves private facts and issues of private
concern, not previously publicized facts on issues of public concern; as
such, a claim of public disclosure of private facts encompassing revenge
pornography would stand.149
Moreover, similar to Zieve v. Hairston—where the Court of Appeals of
Georgia held that an initial lack of permission to reveal information and a
subsequent revealing of that information was an offensive public disclosure
of private facts—the displayed individuals in sexually explicit photographs
reasonably expect them to remain private and rarely authorize their public
dissemination.150 A defendant breaches his or her agreed upon duties of
trust, confidence, and implied contract when he or she publishes these
private representations of the revenge pornography victim on the
144. See id. at *17-18 (asserting that five people receiving private information via
the Internet is a public disclosure because the Internet has the capability to rapidly
disseminate information).
145. See id. at *15, *18 (interpreting that the defendant’s conduct could be
considered outrageous when he disclosed sexually explicit videos to the plaintiff’s
family members through email).
146. See Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 67 P.3d 29, 34 (Idaho 2003)
(recognizing that public interests protect members of society from potential harm or
greater harm and can include reporting a crime and the subsequent prosecution and
proceedings of that crime).
147. See id. at 35 (noting that newsworthy facts are those which involve
governmental or public interests).
148. See id. (stating that the release of a victim’s name was newsworthy because it
involved a matter of public concern, namely the commission of a crime).
149. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (explaining that the
defendant’s speech was not impermissible because it was public in nature).
150. See Zieve v. Hairston, 598 S.E.2d 25, 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (examining
offensiveness in terms of a violation of the victim’s expressed desires).
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Internet.151 Thus, under the rule in Peterson v. Moldofsky, revenge
pornography consists of personal facts and depictions not generally known
to the public such that their wide public disclosure would be offensive,
objectionable, and intolerable to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities.152
3. A Lawsuit Involving Revenge Pornography Would Be Successful Based
upon a Claim of False Light in the Public Eye.
Because revenge pornography depicts sexually explicit photographs
intended exclusively for one’s partner, the portrayed image could,
consistent with Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Company, be juxtaposed
into another context fairly easily and provide proof that the defendant
knowingly published facts that render a false impression of the plaintiff,
distributed the publication to a reasonable number of people, and that the
publication was objectionable to a reasonable person under the
circumstances.153 In Cantrell, the defendant reported to the public that the
plaintiff was just as sad at her own home as she was at her husband’s
funeral although the plaintiff was not present at her home at the time the
defendant knowingly and falsely reported the fabricated story from that
location.154 Similar to Cantrell, an ex-boyfriend posting a pornographic
photograph of his ex-girlfriend to an adult services website stating the exgirlfriend’s sexual preferences, location, work schedule, and any other
personally identifiable information knowingly and falsely portrays to the
public that his ex-girlfriend is an escort.155 Accordingly, displaying a
representation of the ex-girlfriend on a revenge pornography website is a
public disclosure of the girlfriend’s private matters through knowingly false
characterizations and is likely to render a false impression, embarrass, and
be highly objectionable to her.156
Corresponding to the court’s determination in Peterson v. Moldofsky of
151. See id.
152. See Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633,

at *15-16 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (holding that substantial privacy interests must be
invaded in an intolerable manner as determined by a reasonable person).
153. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1974) (stating
that inaccuracies were taken from one instance and represented to have occurred in a
separate and falsified scenario); see also Prosser, supra note 7, at 400.
154. See id. at 253 (suggesting that these were “calculated falsehoods” consistent
with a known or reckless untruth).
155. See id. at 253-54 (noting that calculated falsehoods were sufficient to warrant
liability for placing the plaintiff in a false light).
156. See id. at 252 (remarking that a claim of false light focuses on the defendant’s
knowing or reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s privacy, and not necessarily on the truth
or falsity of the material).
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the point at which a matter becomes publicized, revenge pornography is
viewable on the Internet by members of the public and, therefore, is
distributed to a reasonable number of people.157 Because objectionable and
knowingly false impressions of a victim are portrayed to the public through
the inherent disclosure of private information that occurs with the public
dissemination of revenge pornography, a claim of placing a revenge
pornography victim in a false light in the public eye would be sustained by
a jury.158
4. A Lawsuit Involving Revenge Pornography May Be Successful Based
upon a Claim of Appropriation of Name or Likeness.
Appropriation of one’s name or likeness, which generally pertains to a
celebrity’s name or image used without consent by the defendant for
commercial benefit, could also arise in a lawsuit involving revenge
pornography.159 This specific claim emerges because the commercial
benefit of portraying a celebrity is greater than that of someone unknown to
the public.160 In the context of revenge pornography, a plaintiff would need
to have substantial value to his or her name or likeness and would need to
demonstrate that an ex-partner characterized him or her in a commercial
representation—a hard burden to meet if the ex-partner merely posts the
representation on the Internet out of spite.161 Hence, revenge pornography
is rarely employed for commercial benefit and is used more as an avenue of
retribution and schadenfreude.162
Although generally used to protect the property interests of celebrities,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
157. See Peterson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633, at *15-16, *21 (reasoning that
internet speech that is retrievable by five or more people is likely to become known to
the public).
158. See Prosser, supra note 7, at 400; cf. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 248 (stating that
where the plaintiff is a recipient of ridicule and pity which thereafter cause outrage,
mental distress, shame, and humiliation, the publication of known falsehoods could be
deemed objectionable by a reasonable person).
159. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct.
App. 1995) (noting that the defendant had publicly marketed posters of the plaintiff and
sold thirty percent of the posters for five dollars without the plaintiff’s consent).
160. See Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(declaring that the unauthorized depiction of a non-celebrity individual for commercial
purposes equates to an appropriation of his or her name or likeness).
161. See id. at 621 (remarking that the right to use one’s own name or likeness
exists to compensate for the emotional harm to private citizens who find their identities
utilized for another’s commercial gain).
162. See id. (contending that merely suggesting certain characteristics, without
actually using the plaintiff’s name, portrait, or picture, is not actionable).
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announced in Allen v. National Video that the representation of a victim’s
actual picture and name without consent is actionable.163 Distinguishable
from Allen—where the plaintiff could not make out a valid claim because
the defendant did not legally use the plaintiff’s actual image in
advertisements but instead used the image of a celebrity look-a-like—
revenge pornography does portray the plaintiff’s actual image for
commercial or non-commercial purposes.164 Therefore, because revenge
pornography consists of actual sexually explicit images and personally
identifiable information of the victim posted without his or her
endorsement, any commercial use of it would comprise an actionable claim
of appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.165
Additionally, under the rule in Montana v. San Jose Mercury News—
where the Sixth District Court of Appeal of California explained that the
sale of the celebrity plaintiff’s image would have been a misappropriation
of his name or likeness based on the commercial gain sought were he not a
public figure with newsworthy interest—revenge pornography involves
non-public figure victims who are of little or no newsworthy interest.166
Therefore, non-celebrity victims of revenge pornography whose depictions
and societal status are not of newsworthy interest have a valid claim of
appropriation when his or her name or likeness, as used in sexually explicit
photographs posted on the Internet, is nonetheless disclosed to the public
without authorization and is used for commercial benefit.167 However,
were revenge pornography not used for the defendant’s commercial
benefit, a non-celebrity plaintiff would have a higher probability of success
under intrusion of solitude, public disclosure of private facts, and false light
in the public eye claims because all of the elements of an appropriation of
the plaintiff’s name or likeness would not be satisfied.168

163. See id. at 622 (reasoning that using another’s name or likeness without consent
implies that the subject has endorsed or certified his or her involvement in the display,
which may not be accurate).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641 (Ct.
App. 1995) (acknowledging that the plaintiff was a major player in contemporaneous
newsworthy sporting events and, therefore, societal interests outweighed the potential
commercial value derived from the defendant’s poster representations of the plaintiff).
167. See Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 622-23 (concluding that any living individual has
the right to exploit his or her own name or likeness for commercial benefit based on an
inherent property interest in one’s self).
168. See id. at 621 (reasoning that the right of publicity generally protects the
drawing power of celebrities in publicly marketed products where an economic benefit
would be derived from a celebrity endorsement of a product).
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
As technology changes and advances, the law must accept a broader
construct of privacy.169 Deeming revenge pornography obscene protects
victims’ reputations, safety, and psychological stability by staving off
embarrassment, providing remedies, and serving as a deterrent to future
public postings of such material.170
Further, rendering revenge
pornography obscene safeguards against unwanted publicity and notoriety
stemming from the distribution of material that is damaging to a victim’s
psyche, well-being, reputation, and current and future job opportunities.171
Additionally, a valid cause of action for publicly posting and distributing
intimate images without consent guards against the misappropriation of
one’s possessory interest in his or her name and likeness.172 Regardless of
whether the victim originally took a “selfie”—a photograph an individual
has taken of him or herself—or the perpetrator took the photograph of the
victim, or these sexually explicit materials were illegally obtained through
computer hacking or other means, instituting civil or criminal liability for
the nonconsensual distribution of another’s sexually explicit material for
retributive or malicious purposes enshrines in the law the right to privacy
by enabling the victim to choose what his or her public image should be.173
Hence, the Supreme Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton correctly
confirmed that obscene material does not carry with it a penumbra of
169. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 47, at 196 (noting that as civilization
advances, individuals become more sensitive to publicity such that solitude becomes
more essential).
170. See Prosser, supra note 7, at 422 (implying that the limits of society’s
expectations of privacy are shifting, and therefore, the types of tort claims available
must also shift).
171. See id. at 419-20 (remarking that offensiveness is shielded against to protect a
plaintiff’s psychological interests).
172. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 47, at 209 n.1 (inferring that the right to
one’s own image and the commercial benefit derived from that image stems from an
implied right to privacy).
173. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641-42 (Ct.
App. 1995) (reasoning that one may not publicize facts or use the likeness of another
without consent because it violates the protected interests of the other). But see
Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633, at *14-15
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (noting that in that jurisdiction, it is not a crime to distribute
images taken with consent or properly obtained). See also Mike Isaac, Nude Photos of
Jennifer Lawrence Are Latest Front in Online Privacy Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/technology/trove-of-nude-photos-sparksdebate-over-online-behavior.html?_r=2 (acknowledging that the “unlawful release” of
celebrities’ nude images on the Internet could be curtailed by website owners patrolling
user-generated content, yet this potential solution raises both privacy and civil liberties
concerns).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss1/5

30

Genn: What Comes Off, Comes Back to Burn: Revenge Pornography as the Ho

2014]

WHAT COMES OFF, COMES BACK TO BURN

193

rights; otherwise, the Court would not have decided Stanley on such narrow
grounds.174
A court’s judgment finding revenge pornography not obscene or a
paucity of laws criminalizing such activity creates several difficulties.175
By not protecting citizens from morally repugnant harms such as revenge
pornography, state and federal governments are effectively legitimizing
these destructive exploitations and leaving victims of revenge pornography
with no straightforward and clearly delineated remedies.176
To insulate society, prevent individuals from becoming unwilling nude
celebrities, and preclude relationship issues from being decided on the basis
of threats, coercion, or duress involving the public release of private
material, revenge pornography must be met with statutory regulations as
has been done in several states.177 For example, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9
174. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973) (stating that
conduct that can be prohibited by the police is not automatically protected once moved
from a private venue to a public or “live” theatre stage); see also Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (explaining that censorship of the commercial sale of obscene
materials does not diminish the right to free speech because it still preserves the
concept of a marketplace of ideas).
175. See Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 69 (confirming that states have a
legitimate interest in regulating the commerce of obscene materials in public places
because these materials encroach on societal interests).
176. See People v. Barber, No. 2013NY059761, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 638, at
*1-2 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014) (concluding that the defendant’s conduct was
reprehensible yet did not violate any of the criminal statutes under which he was
charged, including aggravated harassment, dissemination of an unlawful surveillance
image, or public display of offensive sexual material); see also Peterson, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90633, at *15 (stating that local laws have not been violated because the
distribution of explicit images taken consensually is not actionable). But see M. Alex
Johnson, ‘Revenge Porn’ Site Ordered to Pay Ohio Woman $385,000, NBC NEWS
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/revenge-porn-site-orderedpay-ohio-woman-385-000-n57276 (describing a lawsuit whereby a plaintiff
successfully sued the founders of a website where sexually explicit images of the
revenge pornography victim were posted and where punitive and compensatory
damages for child pornography and for a violation of the victim’s right to publicity
were subsequently awarded).
177. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j) (West 2013) (establishing laws against revenge
pornography founded on acts of disorderly conduct); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West
2004) (imposing laws against disorderly conduct and distribution of intimate
photographs with intent to cause emotional distress); see also State ‘Revenge Porn’
Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/staterevenge-porn-legislation.aspx (last updated Sept. 2, 2014) (listing revenge pornography
legislation by state, stating that some revenge pornography websites charge a fee to
have the explicit images removed, and confirming that legislation in most states does
not address the distinction between the unauthorized distribution of sexually explicit
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bans revenge pornography through an unlawful disclosure measure.178
Moreover, because revenge pornography furthers neither a governmental
interest nor promotes the notion of free speech, narrowly tailored
legislation has the ability to prohibit willing recipients from obtaining
unwilling displays of obscenity in the form of revenge pornography.179 In
view of the facts that revenge pornography appeals to the prurient interest,
is patently offensive, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific
value, has deleterious effects on individuals and society as a whole, and
allows a once-trusted partner to place a stranglehold on another’s
reputation, image, and mental state, it is obscene under contemporary
community standards and violates tort law to the extent that it constitutes
an intrusion of solitude, public disclosure of private facts, portrays the
victim in a false light in the public eye, or is an appropriation of the
plaintiff’s name or likeness.180
V. CONCLUSION
The federal government and state governments that have not enacted
laws against revenge pornography fail to account for the limitations
pronounced by the First Amendment’s freedom of speech doctrine and the
Constitution’s implied right to privacy doctrine.181 Thus, Congress and
photographs taken by another with the consent of the displayed individual and those
taken by the displayed individual him or herself and consensually shared with another).
178. See State v. Parsons, No. A-3856-10T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2972,
at *4-5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2011) (holding that under N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:14-9, “the elements the State must prove include: 1) the defendant must know that
he is not licensed or privileged to disclose a photograph; 2) a person actually disclosed
the photograph; 3) the photograph must be of another whose intimate parts are
exposed; and 4) the individual depicted in the photograph has not consented to the
disclosure of the photograph”).
179. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (emphasizing that because an
overbroad suppression of speech may reduce speech to that which is not offensive to
children, it is similarly overbroad in justifying the state’s interest in protecting children
from certain harmful materials); see also Editorial, States Can Address ‘Revenge Porn’
with
Carefully
Crafted
Laws,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
17,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-can-address-revenge-porn-withcarefully-crafted-laws/2014/01/17/4b71dee8-7f0d-11e3-95c60a7aa80874bc_story.html (acknowledging that criminalizing revenge pornography in a
narrow statute is justifiable based on the harm caused to members of society and the
lack of public interests served by the proliferation of revenge pornography).
180. See Prosser, supra note 7, at 398 (stating that an implied right to privacy, as
further established by social mores, defends against mental distress and harm to
reputation).
181. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (claiming that the First
Amendment protects political beliefs but not obscenity because obscenity exploits
individual members of society and society as a whole).
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state legislatures must formulate laws banning revenge pornography and
federal and state courts must properly interpret these laws to close the
revenge pornography loophole.182 Even if the courts do not define revenge
pornography as obscene, federal and state laws should implement tort
remedies to better address revenge pornography’s serious and repugnant
breaches of moral standards that currently do not have the ramifications of
law.183 Failure to do so could complicate and encumber the federal
obscenity doctrine and, consequently, malevolent actors could use the
guarantees of the First Amendment as a sword to perpetrate unjustified
retributive acts against those who are assured such protections.184

182. See Nitke v. Gonzales, 413 F. Supp. 2d 262, 265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(providing that indecent or sexually explicit speech that is obscene under Miller is
unprotected speech because it does not advance congressional intent).
183. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975)
(concluding that as technology changes the way people perceive works and express
themselves, laws will need to construct previously unavailable remedies).
184. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973) (reaffirming
that obscene material in commerce is unprotected by any constitutional doctrine, and
individual victims of revenge pornography are shielded by an implied right to privacy).
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